B Y ALL ACCOUNTS, Augustine's De Trinitate is a complex and difficult
book. Augustine himself declared that it would be "understood only by a few." Among the few cannot be included a number of contemporary trinitarian theologians for whom Augustine has become something of a whipping boy.
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unfortunately this is not the same thing as saying that it is impossible to do contemporary trinitarian theology and not have read Augustine." 2 On the other hand, reading Augustine's De Trinitate is no easy matter. Its 15 books, which in English translation come to around 350 pages of densely argued theological text, make exceptional demands on the tenacity of any reader. It has also become apparent that the work operates with multiple agendas. While Peter Brown classified the work as speculativehe says it displays "remarkable evidence of Augustine's capacity for speculation" 3 -more recent scholarship has increasingly noted the polemic context of the work, directed against Arian and neo-Platonic opponents. This same scholarship has also noted the inadequacy of the typology developed by de Ré gnon that "western Trinitarian theology begins with (in the sense of 'presumes' and 'is ultimately concerned with') divine unity (i.e. the essence) while eastern Trinitarian theology begins with divine diversity (i.e. the persons)." 4 There is far more continuity between Augustine and the concerns of the Cappadocians than many moderns acknowledge. A thoroughgoing, historically sensitive, and theologically insightful commentary on the whole of De Trinitate is not yet available. 5 One issue which has received attention is the structure of the work. It is this question which I would like to address in the present article. I begin with a review of various proposals that have been suggested concerning that structure. I then put forward a hypothesis which suggests a "natural structure," one that relates to the realms of meaning identified by Lonergan in Method in Theology. 6 Indeed the correspondence is so close that one could almost suppose Lonergan had De Trinitate in mind when he wrote about the realms of meaning in Method. In the process of putting forward this hypothesis I also comment on various features of Augustine's work which are further illuminated by Lonergan's writings. Trinitate", Paradeigmata 19 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2000) has appeared. This comes close to fitting the bill, but it does not pay sufficient attention to Books 1-4. 6 Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971 ) 81-85.
PROPOSALS REGARDING THE STRUCTURE OF DE TRINITATE
It is commonly held that Augustine conceived of De Trinitate as a unity. Commentators note that he was annoyed at the early and unauthorized publication of the first eleven and some books of the work, because "he conceived it as a whole, as a very tightly argued and structured unity, not at all suitable for serial publication."
7 Certainly there are often clear transition points at the end of one and beginning of each new chapter. Further Book 15 gives a summary of the whole which indicates some sense of plan for the work. Augustine himself describes his method as an inquisitio, a search not unlike that later proposed by Anselm, of faith seeking understanding. Augustine was concerned "lest the reader mistake a stage in the search for its conclusion," 8 and hence wanted to publish the work as a whole. On the other hand, any personal conception of the work as a whole had to survive the length of time Augustine spent working on the text, a period which is estimated to be over 20 years. Further, modern attempts to uncover the unity of the work, or at least to analyze its structure, have produced a variety of responses.
The most common division to make in relation to the structure of De Trinitate is to distinguish between Books 1-7 and Books 8-15. An older style theology identified the first seven books as concerned with trinitarian faith and doctrine, and the last eight as involving the use of reason. While couched in the language of neo-Scholasticism, this distinction does have some validity inasmuch as there is a turning point reached at the end of Book 7. Augustine concludes this Book with one of his favorite Scriptural quotes, one which characterizes the rest of his work in De Trinitate: "Unless you believe, you will not understand." He then begins Book 8 with an earnest prayer that God "open our understandings." A more useful distinction to make in light of this might be to say there is a transition from Book 7 to Book 8 from what Lonergan identifies as the functional specialty of doctrines to the specialty of systematics.
9 Augustine is not unreasoning in the first seven books, nor is he removed from faith in the last eight books. However, there is a shift toward understanding what we believe that does occur at this juncture.
Less successful in this regard is the distinction made between the first four books, which are "Scriptural" and the rest which draw on human reason. The same objection as above remains for this distinction. Augustine would not recognize this as descriptive of his project, as he seeks the most profound integration of faith and reason, not its sharp disjunction. On the other hand, this attempted structural distinction does alert us to the fact that something different is happening in Books 1-4 than is happening in Books 5-7. Any structural analysis must account for this difference.
These two "traditional" structural accounts of De Trinitate have been superseded by more recent historically sensitive accounts by scholars such as Edmund Hill, John Cavadini, and Johannes Brachtendorf.
Hill has proposed a chiastic structure for De Trinitate. In his book, The Mystery of the Trinity, he suggests a structure along the following lines:
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In his translation of De Trinitate, Hill spells out the same divisions as a descent-ascent model, a parabola which moves from the scriptural Book 1 through the missions (Books 2-4) to a linguistic and logical analysis (Books 5-7) through the transition in Book 8 to an "inward mode," back to the psychological (Books 9-11) which links with the rational reflections in Books 5-7; to the human image linked to the missions as the story of the fall and redemption, and concluding with the scriptural Book 15.
11 As is often the case with such chiastic analyses, Hill himself concedes that "it is a little too neat . . . [t] o speak plainly the six books we are here concerned with do not have the clear-cut structure of the six in the first half of the work ." 12 It does, however, have the advantage of being more closely tied to the detail of the contents of the work than the simplistic faith-reason division previously used.
In his article: "The Structure and Intention of Augustine's De Trinitate," Cavadini proposes a more contextual reading of the work. He reads it as a polemic work directed against neo-Platonic methods of ascent to the di-vine. 13 The influence of neo-Platonism on Augustine is evident by his own account in the Confessions. Yet that same work displays his dissatisfaction with their approach to God, its lack of humility, and its failure to learn from the Incarnation. Cavadini draws a more negative relationship:
De Trinitate uses the Neoplatonic soteriology of ascent only to impress it into the service of a thoroughgoing critique of its claim to raise the inductee to the contemplation of God, a critique which, more generally, becomes a declaration of the futility of any attempt to come to any saving knowledge of God apart from Christ.
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For Cavadini the structure of De Trinitate is built upon this deliberate failure.
Cavadini is correct in identifying a polemic against neo-Platonism operating in De Trinitate. That this is part of the overall intention of the author is made clear in the first book, where he speaks of those who "raise their regard to the unchanging substance which is God. But so top-heavy are they with the load of their own mortality, that what they do not know they wish to give the impression of knowing, and what they wish to know they cannot" (Book 1.1). Put simply they are presumptuous. However, Cavadini's approach sheds little light on the first seven books, except as a prelude to the failed attempt at ascent.
In a more recent article, 16 Cavadini shifts his focus from neo-Platonic ascent and its failures to the broader pedagogical themes in De Trinitate. He describes the work as "undogmatic, open-ended and experimental."
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He draws our attention in particular to the theme of humans being made in the image of God. He focuses on the movement from inner word to outer word, from the mind's pre-linguistic self-expression to its actualisation "in the world of sign and signification, that is, of culture."
18 What is vital for Cavadini is this movement from inner word to outer sign. The inner word is "conceived either in covetousness or charity." If conceived in covetousness or dominated by pride, then it will "inevitably produce cultures which instantiate or express this preference of power over justice."
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The social transmission of knowledge is never untouched by the original intention within which the inner word is formed. This suggestion of Cavadini, while providing significant insights into a theme present in the work, cannot claim to represent an account of the work as a whole. He makes numerous references to the text of De Trinitate, but the overwhelming majority of them are to the second half of the work. Again the first half is reduced to a prelude to the real issues raised in the second half.
Most recently Brachtendorf has provided a book-length study of the structure of De Trinitate. 20 He places Augustine's work in a neo-Platonic context, in particular the Plotinian doctrine of the mind. This allows Augustine to overcome the emanationist and subordinationist tendencies in neo-Platonic metaphysics through an account of the mind, its self-presence and activities. He begins his account of De Trinitate with a commentary on Books 5-7, which Brachtendorf views as an exposition of traditional doctrine in Aristotelian philosophical categories. However, his main interest is in Books 8-15, to which he devotes more than two-thirds of his commentary. Brachtendorf argues that Books 9-14 "do not represent an attempt at an ascent to God, but only an ascent to an insight into the human mind in order to reveal how it images the triune God." 21 Central to this argument is Book 10 where Augustine overcomes the Plotinian view of human consciousness as self-absorption with a detailed analysis of the mind's selfpresence as a permanent, unchanging and constitutive reflexivity. 22 It is in the structure of this self-presence, consisting of memoria sui, intelligentia sui, and voluntas sui, that we find the trinitarian imago Dei. The distinction between the mind's self-presence and its explicit self-knowledge form the basis of Augustine's analysis of our human efforts to approach God .
While Brachtendorf has presented a meticulous and scholarly study of De Trinitate there remain unanswered questions. Again, not much attention is given to the early Books, in particular the first four scriptural Books. Their place in the overall unity of Augustine's thought is not clarified. Further, while his highlighting of Book 10 and its disengagement with Plotinian accounts of consciousness is a major achievement, 23 25 Merriell rejects the earlier faith-reason division as sundering the unity of the work. He draws our attention to two questions which Augustine raises in Book 1:
First, how are we to understand that Father, Son and Holy Spirit work indivisibly as one God, yet play distinct roles within the created world? Secondly, how can we understand the distinction of the Holy Spirit within the Trinity since we cannot say that the Father or the Son or both have begotten Him? 26 He further notes how these two questions resurface at different places within De Trinitate giving "a specific direction to Augustine's investigation of the mystery of the Trinity."
27 These two questions then provide Merriell with a thematic key to unlock the structure of De Trinitate. Thus in Books 1-4 he claims the first question dominates, though by the end of Book 4 Augustine raises the issue of the Filioque. This leads to a more extended treatment of the problem of the Holy Spirit, culminating in the designation of the Holy Spirit as Love in Book 6. This insight then dominates the remainder of the work. "The entire search unfolds from the analogy of love in Book 8 and is explicitly aimed at the solution of the problem concerning the distinction of the Holy Spirit from the Son by means of the notion of love."
28 This approach leads Merriell to stress the unity of the work through the unifying force of these two questions. Still there is an acknowledgement of some transitions within relatively unified treatments in Books 1-4, 5-7, and 8-15.
While I endorse Merriell's suggestion that various themes and questions recur within De Trinitate, and that this repetition is an essential feature of the structure of the work, I do not think he has paid sufficient attention to the nature of the transitions and the modes of thought that Augustine is operating out of in the various sections. I would like to suggest that there are four sections to De Trinitate, Books 1-4, 5-7, 8-11, and 12-15 why themes and questions are repeated is that Augustine tends to consider them from the perspective of these different realms of meaning. I hope to illustrate this point with an indication of Augustine's treatment of the Filioque, which is central to the problem of the distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit. However, before I put forward this proposal, I must give a brief account of what is meant by "realms of meaning" as conceived by Lonergan.
REALMS OF MEANING 29
In Method in Theology Lonergan identifies four distinct realms or worlds of meaning which arise from different modes of conscious and intentional operation. He begins by distinguishing between the realm of common sense and the realm of theory. The realm of common sense is the realm of persons and things in relation to us, peopled by relatives, friends, acquaintances, fellow citizens, and the rest of humanity. Its terms are those of everyday language and its operation that of the self-corrective spiral of learning heading toward an understanding of things in relation to us. As common, it is common to a people and hence particular to that people who share a common set of meanings and values. It varies from time to time and place to place. It speaks an everyday language which knows not the intrinsic meaning of things, but the proper use of words in a proper context. Still, intelligence can demand more. It asks not just how things are in relation to us, but how things are in relation to one another; not just how to correctly use words, but their precise meaning; not just their meaning for this people in this place and time, but their meaning for all people everywhere. Thus Socrates asked for the meaning of justice, not just in Athens but everywhere. Under the influence of this systematic exigence, we develop technical meanings and language, which, though they relate to the same objects, do so in a new way. We no longer speak of feeling hot; we specify a temperature. We no longer speak of going faster; we determine a precise acceleration. A new realm of meaning develops, the realm of theory. Different communities develop different theoretical realmsscientific, technical, theological, and so on. Each is driven by the same systematic exigence, the drive to understand things in relation to other things, not just to ourselves.
The two realms exist in some tension. Lonergan often refers to Eddington's two tables, the solid, colored table of commonsense, and the table composed mostly of empty space of the physicist. Who is right? Is common sense simply a form of ignorance to be replaced by science, or is science simply of pragmatic value, allowing us to control things without really penetrating to their reality? These questions Lonergan refers to as arising from a critical exigence, and their answers can be found not in the development of a new theory but by moving to a new realm of meaning, that of interiority. This realm is uncovered through an act of introspection or self-appropriation, not as withdrawal from the world, but as a heightening of consciousness, an act of attending to the conscious subject as it engages in its intentional activities. There one can uncover the structures, norms and potentialities of human subjectivity. Mastery of this interior realm can provide one with the resources needed to address critical epistemological and metaphysical questions, and heal the tensions between the realms of common sense and theory. Lonergan notes that the outcome of this selfappropriation resembles theory, but that "as this heightened consciousness constitutes the evidence for one's account of knowledge, such an account by the proximity of the evidence differs from all other [theoretical] expressions."
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Finally Lonergan identifies a transcendent realm corresponding to the human desire for complete intelligibility, unconditioned judgment and a good beyond all criticism. This draws us to a realm beyond those of common sense, of theory and of interiority into a realm of fulfilment, peace and joy in which God is known and loved. This is a realm of religious experience and its expression, culminating in mystical prayer and ultimately union with God.
APPLICATION TO DE TRINITATE

The Realm of Common Sense: Books 1-4
It is commonly agreed that Books 1-4 form the scriptural basis for Augustine's teaching on the Trinity. It is not unreasonable, I would suggest, to read these Books as an exploration of Christian belief in the Trinity within the realm of a scripturally informed, and hence Christian, common sense. Now it is one thing to suggest that Books 1-4 operate in the realm of a scripturally informed common sense. It is another to provide evidence. The first thing to note is that such a designation is not meant to denigrate what Augustine achieves in these books. Augustine's exegesis is incredibly detailed, drawing on his vast storehouse of scriptural knowledge. He draws freely and regularly from the whole range of Scripture to advance the agenda he established in the initial sections of Book 1. Prominent among these are his anti-Arian arguments and his desire to move his readers beyond materialistic conceptions of the divine. It is worth pointing out in this context that Lonergan refers to the work of modern biblical and historical scholarship as a specialized form of common sense.
31 More positively, I note the lack of any deployment of technical terms, used in a technical manner. He uses terms such as substance, essence, and person, but his deployment of them remains unexamined. They are "common notions," not technical terms. Next we might draw attention to Augustine's own understanding of the place of the Scriptures in his argument. He speaks of the Scriptures as "adapting itself to babes" (Book 1.2) so that it might lead us to higher realities. The Scriptures "are in the habit of making something like children's toys out of things that occur in creation" (Book 1.2) in order to capture our "sickly gaze." Further it uses "no manner of speaking that is not in common human usage [in consuetudine humana]" (Book 1.23). From this we might conclude that Augustine views the Scriptures themselves as operating in a realm of common sense, adopting a form of communication which reaches the common person. Finally, apart from patience and perseverance, Augustine demands nothing more from his readers than their acceptance of the word of God as true. This is the common faith of a Christian believer. The Scriptures are the unerring word of God, a source which cannot be contradicted, though its meaning may require examination.
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Concerning the content covered in these four books, the questions identified by Merriell loom large. Book 1 is concerned largely with countering Arian arguments which use Scripture to imply the subordination of the Son. Augustine counters this position with an entirely Scriptural argument, developing a rule for interpreting the Biblical texts, so that apparently subordinationist texts are taken to refer to Jesus in his humanity. Books 2-3 are concerned with a reading of Old Testament theophanies. Augustine is seeking to preserve the unity of operation of the three persons in the Old Testament, through his insistence that these theophanies not be read as trinitarian revelations, contrary to the approach of many of the other Church Fathers. However, in Book 4 he explores the individual missions of the Son and the Spirit to display their distinctive roles in the economy of 31 "Let the term, scholarship, be employed to denote the learning that consists in a commonsense grasp of the commonsense thought, speech, action of distant places and/or times" (ibid. 233).
32 Perhaps this aspect places us at such a distance from what he is doing, as Christian common sense struggles to incorporate the results of critical historical readings of Scripture. My own students' reaction to Augustinian exegesis here was to find it labored to the point of perplexity on their part. His fundamental commitment to the truth of the Scriptural word was not part of their intellectual horizon.
salvation. He includes in this his first treatment of the Filioque (Book 4.29) . Again, throughout this his approach is entirely Scriptural.
Book 4 ends with a reference to the contents of the next book where "we shall see with the Lord's help what sort of subtle crafty arguments the heretics [i.e. Arians] bring forward and how they can be demolished" (Book 4.32). It is an interesting, even surprising, observation because Augustine has already spent considerable time and energy refuting these same heretics in Book 1. But the rules have shifted, from the realm of a scripturally informed common sense, to a philosophically informed realm of theory: "From now on I will be attempting to say things that cannot altogether be said as they are thought by a man" (Book 5.1).
The Realm of Theory: Books 5-7
The first thing that may strike the reader of 5-7 is that the flood of Scriptural texts apparent in Books 1-4 dries up to a trickle. The "subtle crafty argument" of the heretics now considered is not Scriptural, but philosophical. The terms substance, essence, person, accident, and relation begin to dominate the discussion. Augustine introduces the ten Aristotelian predicates (Book 5.2); he struggles with the distinction between ousia and hypostasis (Book 5.10); he questions the validity of the term persona to designate that which is distinct in the Trinity (Book 5.10, 7.7); he explores whether persona is a genus or a species (Book 7.7-11). We have clearly moved into a realm of technical, theoretical meaning. Of course it is not as if Scripture is completely absent, but now it is a source of dilemmas that arise because of a shift from common sense to theoretical meaning.
As regards the content, the same issues that are raised in Books 1-4, are again treated in these books, but now from a theoretical perspective. As with the Cappadocians, Augustine introduces the notion of relations as a way of distinguishing the persons of the Trinity, while preserving the divine unity. This pushes him to introduce the Filioque as a way to distinguish the Spirit from the Son (Book 5.12-15). He even edges toward a solution to the problem of the distinct actions of the persons in relation to creation. In the concluding section of Book 5 Augustine explores the problem of the way in which God relates to the created order-in order to deal with the trinitarian question one must first master the more general question of God in relation to creation. The solution that emerges is remarkably similar to what Lonergan calls "contingent predication": when he is called something with reference to creation, while indeed he begins to be called it in time, we should understand that this does not involve anything happening to God's own substance, but only to the created thing to which the relationship predicated of him refers (Book 5.17).
Lonergan scholars will know that Lonergan adopts this same approach to speak of the ontological constitution of Christ.
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Books 6-7 deal with a problem that arises in the shift from the realm of common sense to the realm of theory. Scripture states things which may be 'appropriate' in the realm of common sense, but which are more problematic in the shift to the realm of theory. The text which grips Augustine's concerns is 1 Corinthians 1:24: "Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God." Augustine is well aware that the terms power and wisdom are essential terms, that is, they refer to the divine essence. If this is the case, how then can they be predicated of the Son? In the terms of later Scholasticism he is dealing with the problem of appropriation. In this context he also makes the suggestion that just as it is 'appropriate' to speak of the Son as Wisdom, so to it is 'appropriate' to speak of the Spirit as Love (Book 7.6). Still a large part of Book 7, specifically 7.7-11, is given over to a highly theoretical discussion of the concept person in terms of genus and species. Augustine was far more aware of the difficulties associated with the word, indeed with any word, which is used to designate that which is distinct in the Trinity, than were the Cappadocians. Indeed many modern theologians could learn from Augustine on this matter.
34
The Realm of Interiority: Books 8-11
Just about every structural analysis of De Trinitate notes that Book 7 marks some type of conclusion to one aspect of Augustine's project and Book 8 the beginning of a new phase. Augustine himself signals this when he challenges us to "turn our attention to the things we are going to discuss in a more inward manner than the things that have been discussed above, though in fact they are the same things" (Book 8.1). Some commentators will speak of this as the beginning of a neo-Platonic process of ascent, taking us inward and upward. However, this is just a descriptive category. In more explanatory language Augustine is inviting us into the realm of interiority. The four books that follow, Books 8-11, are a most demanding and exacting exploration of the interior realm. The trickle of Scriptural quotes now evaporates leaving small pools of references which rarely relate to trinitarian issues, but are more often words of encouragement, or symbols of the quest one has entered. 34 Many modern theologians seem to use the term person more as an attribute of being. This position is common among the "social Trinitarians" such as Moltmann and Volf. In doing so they inevitably display a tendency toward tritheism.
Book 8 serves as a general and gentle introduction into the realm of interiority, inviting the reader to reflect on the experience of truth: "Come, hold it in that first moment in which so to speak you caught a flash . . . when the word 'truth' was spoken" (Book 8.3) . 35 Is Augustine here alluding to the flash of insight? He reminds the readers of their various judgments of value and invites them to explore the interior ground of these judgments (Book 8.4-5). He makes an initial exploration of the interrelationship of knowledge and love (Book 8.5). He alerts the reader to the constant selfpresence of the mind: "What after all is so intimately known and so aware of its own existence as that by which things enter into our awareness, namely the mind?" (Book 8.9) He introduces the first of many "trinities," "the lover, what is being loved and love" and concludes that though we have not yet found what we are looking for "we have found where to look for it" (Book 8.14).
Book 9 begins in earnest to find some image of the trinitarian God in the inner human being. He turns aside the "trinity" of lover, loved, and love, because in the case of self-love it collapses into a binity. In its place he develops the analogy of the mind, its self-knowledge and its self-love (Book 9.3-5). Focusing on the self-knowledge of the mind, he describes it in terms of the production of an inner word. This inner word becomes the primary analogue for the procession of the Word from the Father. Augustine further seeks to qualify the nature of this word: it expresses "approval or disapproval," i.e., a judgment of value (Book 9.12); to do with practical action "either for sinning or for doing good" (Book 9.13); it is like uttering a definition (Book 9.15). Finally it is "knowledge with love":
The kind of word then that we are now wishing to distinguish and propose is "knowledge with love." So when the mind knows and loves itself, its word is joined to it with love. And since it loves knowledge and knows love, the word is in the love and the love is in the word and both [are] in the lover and the utterer (Book 9.15).
In all this Augustine is inviting us to push our own experience to its absolute limits. Knowledge is by a form of identity: "this knowledge is its word in such as way that it matches it exactly and is equal to it and identical . . . what is begotten is equal to the begetter" (Book 9.16). The more perfect the knowledge the more perfect the identity between the knowledge and what is known. In God this becomes an identity of substance.
We can see in this that Augustine is now dealing with the very same question that we find in the other two realms, that of the substantial unity of the divinity, but now from the perspective of interiority. Similarly, Augustine raises the question of the distinction of the Holy Spirit from the Son (Book 9.17). Within the realm of interiority this becomes the question of the relationship between knowledge and love. Already Augustine has drawn on what has been axiomatic for him, "nothing is loved which is not known." Now he begins to question that axiom. He identifies an inquisitiveness, an appetite for finding out, which precedes knowledge. This inquisitiveness "does not indeed appear to be the love with which what is known is loved . . . yet it is something of the same kind . . . this same appetite becomes love of the thing known" (Book 9.18). This observation poses a problem for Augustine, which he spends most of Book 10 seeking to resolve.
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Book 10 presents us with a very precise and accurate phenomenology of consciousness. The first two chapters of Book 10 are then taken up with an analysis of the problem identified at the end of Book 9. Augustine seeks to prove that in every case, this preceding desire is itself a love based on knowledge. However, he still notes that:
These are the reasons why people who want to know something they do not know seem to love the unknown; and because of their keen appetite for inquiry they cannot be said to be without love. But if you look at the matter carefully I think I have truly made out the case for saying that in fact it is otherwise, and nothing at all is loved if it is unknown. However the examples I have given are of people wanting to know something which they are not themselves; so we must see if some new issue does not arise when the mind desires to know itself (Book 10.4).
Thus our attention is turned to the question of the mind, its self-knowledge and self-love, to see if "some new issue" might appear. It is at this stage that Augustine presents us with his phenomenology of consciousness, or what he refers to as mind (mens). 37 The problem is one of how the mind knows itself, given its constant "self-presence," that is, "nothing can be more present to it than itself" (Book 10.5). In modern terms Augustine is asking about the problem of "introspection."
Immediately, however, Augustine dispels any similarity with ocular experience. The eye cannot see itself, except it looks in a mirror: "and it is not to be supposed that in the contemplation of non-bodily things a similar device can be provided, so that the mind can know itself, as in a mirror" (Book 10.5). Rather the mind knows itself in the very act of knowing. "It knows what knowing is, and while it loves this that it knows, it also longs to know itself. But where in this case does it know itself knowing, if it does not know itself?" (ibid.):
How comes it then that a mind which does not know itself knows itself knowing something else? It is not that it knows another mind knowing, but itself knowing. Therefore it knows itself. And then when it seeks itself to know itself, it already knows itself seeking. So it already knows itself. It follows then that it simply cannot not know itself, since by the very fact of knowing itself not knowing, it knows itself (ibid).
Augustine is appealing to the mind's self-knowledge, or self-presence in the mind's normal operations, in seeking, and in knowing. In these very experiences the mind knows itself as seeking or knowing. Still, the object of this seeking and knowing can be anything. Augustine makes this clear when he returns to the problem of introspection later in Book 10:
And this is its impurity, that while it attempts to think of itself alone, it supposes itself to be that without which it is unable to think of itself. And so when it is bidden to know itself, it should not start looking for itself as though it had drawn off from itself, but should draw off what it has added to itself . . . Let the mind then recognise itself and not go looking for itself as if it were absent, but rather turn to itself the interest of its will [intentionem voluntatis] (Book 10.11).
The key here is the phrase, "it should not start looking for itself as though it had drawn off from itself, but should draw off what it has added to itself." Against Plotinus, introspection is not a matter of withdrawal from the world. Nor should we seek the mind as if it were not present. Rather it is present in every cognitional act. So we seek the mind, not as something absent; rather we require an act of attention, the "interest of the will," that can identify the presence of mind in each and every cognitional act. It is clear from this account that Augustine had a very clear grasp of the facts, a clear mastery of the realm of interiority.
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In light of the achievements of Books 9 and 10, I must say I find Book 11 something of an anti-climax. It is not clear to me, at least, what Augustine is seeking to achieve in this Book. He is still in interior mode, with a consideration of various "trinities" in the operation of the mind, but the link with sensory experience muddies the waters somewhat. It may be that he is backing off from the heights of the previous two books to offer his readers something more accessible. He refers at the end of Book 10 to offer 38 The conclusion of Book 10 seems to introduce the triad of memory, understanding, and will without any real explanation. Certainly it puzzles Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity 27 and it puzzled me. A solution has been offered by Biolo, "A Lonerganian Approach to St Augustine's Interpretation of Consciousness." Biolo argues that memoria sui is a technical term in Augustine for the primitive selfpresence of the subject.
something to "those who are slower on the uptake" (Book 10.19), but overall I think it adds little to his argument.
The Transcendent Realm: Books 12-15
While older analyses tend to place Books 12-15 together with Books 8-11, it should be clear to the reader that something very different is happening here. Certainly any analysis that suggests that these books are concerned with the use of human reason to understand or supplement belief is misplaced. A significant indicator is the renewed interest Augustine shows in the Scriptures. 39 Almost absent from Books 8-11, the Scriptures now come flooding back into the text. However, their deployment is very different from the first four books where Augustine is seeking to expound and defend Christian faith from the Scriptures. Here Augustine is using the Scriptures in a more meditative and contemplative manner, bringing us back into the drama of human salvation and God's saving actions.
While Augustine has explored several trinities in the books prior to Book 12, none attains the "image of God" which he is seeking. Indeed the phrase "image of God" becomes a heart beat in Book 12, used over 40 times, as Augustine explores the meaning of Genesis 1:28 and the impact that the fall of human beings has made in God's image in them. Sin undermines the image of God and turns the soul away from the eternal unchanging realm to the changeable, temporal world of the senses. The image of God "can only be preserved when facing him from whom its impression is received" (Book 12.16). In this Book Augustine is inviting the reader to move beyond the realm of interiority per se and into the realm where God is known and loved. He is concerned not with knowledge but wisdom, the "contemplation of eternal things" (Book 12.22 
):
And what among eternal things is more excellent than God whose nature alone is unchangeable? And what is worship of him but the love of him by which we now desire to see him, and believe and hope that we will see him? (Book 12.22) There is an ascent here, but not the ascent of neo-Platonic achievement, restricted to the few. It is an ascent born of Christian faith, hope and love, of God's love poured into our hearts, the work of divine grace.
Book 13 reinforces the invitation to the transcendent realm through a reflection on the human desire for happiness (Book 13.6-9), to conclude that the truly happy person:
will not want to live a bad life in that bliss, nor will he want anything that he lacks, nor will he lack anything that he wants. Whatever he loves will be there, and he will not desire anything that is not there. Everything that is there will be good, and the most high God will be the most high good, and will be available for the enjoyment of his lovers, and thus total happiness will be forever assured (Book 13.10).
Still the shadow that hangs over our possibility of happiness is death, and so our immortality becomes a condition for the possibility of human happiness. And to win for us the possibility of immortality, the Word became flesh and dwelt among us:
For surely if the Son of God by nature became son of man by mercy for the sake of the sons of men . . . how much easier it is to believe that the sons of men by nature can become sons of God by grace and dwell in God; for it is in him alone and thanks to him alone that they can be happy, by sharing in his immortality; it was to persuade us of this that the Son of God came to share in our mortality (Book 13.12).
He then proceeds to give a long and detailed account of the process of salvation, for those who question why God chose this way to save human beings (Book 13.13-23). The purpose here is, I think, more doxological than apologetic or dogmatic. Augustine is inviting us to give praise to God for the work achieved in the death and resurrection of Jesus. It is a "demonstration of how much value God put on us and how much he loved us" (Book 13.13). And our response is to be drawn into the realm in which God is known and loved.
At the end of Book 13 Augustine is still adamant that he has not yet found the image of God he is seeking. He continues his search in earnest in Book 14 with the immediate reminder that true human wisdom is "the true and principal worship of God" (Book 14.1), the "knowledge of divine things" (Book 14.3). Again Augustine considers and rejects several proposals, including revisiting his explorations of Book 10. However some sort of climax is reached when Augustine declares that the image of God is not to be found in remembering, knowing and loving self, but rather God:
This trinity of the mind is not really the image of God because the mind remembers and understands and loves itself, but because it is also able to remember and understand and love him by whom it was made. And when it does this it becomes wise . . . Let it then remember its God to whose image it was made, and understand and love him. To put it in a word, let it worship the uncreated God . . . (Book 14.15 ).
Again we witness Augustine inviting the reader to enter into the realm of transcendence. Still the image of God which results only comes to complete perfection in the perfect vision of God: "From this is it clear that the image of God will achieve its full likeness of him when it attains to the full vision of him" (Book 14.24).
As Merriell has noted of Book 15, it is wrong "to dismiss it as nothing more than a summary of the preceding books plus a concluding evaluation that gives a sceptical verdict on the entire enterprise of Books 8 to 14." 40 Two-thirds of the Book is taken up with renewed accounts of the procession of the Word and the Spirit. Is Augustine simply repeating the material of Book 9 with some additional observations and nuances? One clear difference between this material and that of Book 9 is the presence of countless Scriptural references. It is indicative that while references to the Johannine prologue abound in Book 15, there is not a single reference to it in Book 9, despite the obvious possibilities in discussing the procession of the word in that Book. I do not think it is stretching things too far to suggest that in this Book Augustine is making connections between his exploration in the interior realm with fundamental Christian religious experience, mediated through the Scriptures. We are to "seek his face evermore" (Book 15.2-Psalm 105.3).
41 Now the proceeding Word is not just any word, but the "Yes, yes; no, no" of the Father (Matthew 5:37, 2 Corinthians 1:19-20; James 5:12), a Word which is "truly truth," a transcendent affirmation of being (Book 15.23) . Similarly the Holy Spirit: "So it is God the Holy Spirit proceeding from God who fires man to love God and neighbor when he has been given to him, and he himself is love" (Book 15.31). This gift, which "fires man to love God," is transcendent value, value beyond all criticism, the experience of which "is the basic fulfilment of our conscious intentionality."
42 Again we find ourselves drawn into the realm of transcendence.
THE FILIOQUE IN THE DIFFERENT REALMS OF MEANING
I would like now to return to the question of the distinction between the Word and the Spirit. As Merriell notes, it is a question which recurs throughout De Trinitate-why is the Spirit not a second Son? How is his procession different from that of the Son? A key element in Augustine's response is the Filioque, which draws the Son into the procession of the Spirit. In order to further the thesis that Augustine wrote De Trinitate around four distinct realms of meaning, I would like to examine how this question appears in each realm and finds some resolution within that realm. The treatment will be fairly summary, but I hope it will help illustrate the differences between the realms as they handle a single problem.
Realm of Common Sense
As I have argued, the first four books of De Trinitate represent an exploration of various questions within the realm of a scripturally in- 40 Merriell, To the Image of the Trinity 30. 41 If the phrase "image of God" is the recurrent theme of Book 12, the word "seek," as in "seek his face," "seek the Lord," "seek Him," etc., is the recurrent theme of Book 15. 
Realm of Theory
Here the question takes on a different slant. Augustine has introduced us to the notions of person, relation, substance, and essence. In Book 5.12-16 he teases out the distinction between the Spirit and the Son. In particular in 5.13 he notes the asymmetry of the relationships between the Spirit and the Father and Son, compared with the relationship between the Father and the Son:
We say the Holy Spirit of the Father, but we do not reverse it and say the Father of the Holy Spirit, or then we should take the Holy Spirit to be his son. Again we say the Holy Spirit of the Son, but we do not say the Son of the Holy Spirit, or we should take the Holy Spirit to be his father.
The relationship of Father and Son already specifies the personal identity of both Father and Son. If we say, "Father of the Holy Spirit," we either over-specify the Father or under-specify the Spirit and make him indistinguishable from the Son or a second Son. None of these options Augustine finds acceptable. His solution is to implicate the Son in the procession of the Spirit:
We must confess that the Father and the Son are the origin of the Holy Spirit; not two origins, but just as the Father and Son are one God, and with reference to creation one creator and one lord, so with reference to the Holy Spirit they are one origin; but with reference to creation Father, Son and Holy Spirit are one origin, just as they are one creator and one lord (Book 5.15).
The argument Augustine adopts is one drawn from the realm of theory, based on personal distinctions grounded in the notion of relationship. Aquinas adopts the same solution in Summa theologiae 1, q. 36, a. 2, where he argues that either one asserts the Filioque as in the West, or one adopts a Spirituque, which "no one says." 43 Otherwise it is impossible to distinguish the Son from the Spirit.
Realm of Interiority
In the realm of interiority the question of the distinction between the Son and the Spirit emerges once again and requires yet another treatment. Now the question is dealt with not by reference to persons and their defining relations, but by reference to psychological facts. The basic psychological question, which Augustine refers to as analogous to the distinction between the Son and the Spirit, is that of the relationship between knowledge and love: "what I am asking is whether something can be loved which is unknown?" (Book 8.6). While he acknowledges that "something can be loved which is unknown, provided it is believed" (Book 8.6), the general principle that knowledge precedes love remains intact: "Now the mind cannot love itself unless it also knows itself. How can it love what it does not know?" (Book 9.3).
Yet, at the end of Book 9, Augustine raises further questions about the interrelationship of knowledge and love which cast doubt over this stance. He identifies an appetite or desire for knowledge which precedes knowledge which "does not indeed appear to be love with which what is known is loved, yet is something of the same kind" (Book 9.18). This problem is then pursued with the utmost rigor in Book 10, where having worked through the case of external objects to convince us that it is impossible to love the unknown (Book 10.3), he then turns his attention to the mind itself to "see if some new issue does not arise when the mind desires to know itself" (Book 10.4).
As I have already noted this leads Augustine deep into the interior realm, as he develops a most precise phenomenology of human consciousness. What is at stake in this discussion is precisely the psychological analogy for the Filioque. This is the interior and analogous basis for distinguishing the Son from the Spirit.
Realm of Transcendence
Merriell notes that in Book 15 Augustine returns to the problem of the distinction between the Son and the Spirit, in particular why the Spirit is not a second Son. He suggests that Augustine is discouraged by his "repeated failure to provide an adequate solution" but then presses on to offer "a valuable solution that depends on the fundamental doctrine of the procession of the Spirit from both the Father and the Son." 44 I do not agree with his analysis of the situation. I think Augustine has offered three dif-ferent solutions in the three realms of meaning, a scripturally informed common sense, the realm of theory and the realm of interiority. It is not that these solutions fail. Indeed they have become part of the classical Western approach to the theology of the Spirit. However, they are not where Augustine wants his reader to end up. Augustine the theologian never ceases to be Augustine the bishop concerned with the spiritual life of his readers. And so the question must also be pursued in the realm of transcendence. Now Augustine says many things about the Holy Spirit in terms of the realm of transcendence, in particular about the Holy Spirit as Love, that experience of transcendent value which is the fulfilment of our conscious intentionality, the gift of God's love poured into our hearts. And he also reworks the problem of the Filioque in terms similar to Book 9, though with the refinement that while the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, he "proceeds from the Father principally." However, it seems to me that it is only toward the end of the Book that he attempts to deal with the problem in terms of the realm of transcendence, and basically fails:
So then you have seen many true things and distinguished between them and the light by which you have seen them. Lift up your eyes to that light and fix them on that if you can. Thus you will see how the birth of the Word of God differs from the procession of the gift of God; which is the reason why the only-begotten Son said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, not that he was begotten of him; otherwise he would be his own brother. And hence while the Spirit of them both is a kind of consubstantial communion of Father and Son, he is not (it is just unthinkable) called the Son of them both. But you are unable to fix your gaze there in order to observe this clearly and distinctly. You cannot do it, I know. I am telling the truth, I am telling it to myself, I know what I cannot do (Book 15.50).
Augustine has sought a solution in the transcendent realm, but admits his own failure to carry through to a proper conclusion. In the light of this failure Augustine reverts back to his psychological analogy: "There is suggested a certain difference between birth and procession, because to observe by thought is not the same thing as to desire or even to enjoy by will; that all this is so, let him note and discern who can" (Book 15.50).
CONCLUSION
The aim of this study has been to present a structural analysis of Augustine's De Trinitate using Lonergan's notions of realms of meaning. I believe that my analysis is at the least suggestive and helpful in understanding why themes recur in so many different contexts throughout the work. The suggestion is not, of course, that Augustine has something like Lonergan's realms of meaning in mind, or even that he deliberately structured his work in the way I have suggested. The structure is, I suggest, "natural" in the sense that it follows the unfolding exigencies of the mind to ask questions and order thought. In doing so I would suggest that Au-gustine has anticipated Lonergan's realms of meaning by several centuries. For those who might be concerned with the validity of using a modern hermeneutic to such an ancient text, it is an intriguing question to ask whether Lonergan had Augustine's De Trinitate in mind when he wrote about the realms of meaning. Lonergan's thought was steeped in the tradition of Augustine and Aquinas and, as I have noted elsewhere, there are close parallels between Augustine's account of consciousness in Book 10 and the account given by Lonergan in Chapter 11 of Insight.
45 That Lonergan supervised the thesis of Salvino Biolo on Augustine is indication of his familiarity with De Trinitate.
46 Perhaps a fuller study of the relationship between Augustine and Lonergan is yet to be done.
47
A more intriguing question is whether Augustine's precise phenomenology of consciousness would ever have occurred had he not been motivated by the trinitarian problem. Here as elsewhere, revelation drives us toward the "turn to the subject," forcing us to explore more deeply the interior realm. 48 Revelation is culturally transformative, extending our cultural resources to encompass this interior realm, and in the case of Augustine, gain mastery over it.
A concluding comment concerns the sophistication of Augustine's work. If the above analysis is correct, then Augustine has quite carefully moved from one realm of meaning to another as he deals with his major trinitarian questions. Lonergan would say he instances a significant differentiation of consciousness. Not so, many of his contemporary critics who often move indiscriminately from one realm of meaning to another, citing now Scripture, then dabbling in a little theory and finally failing to recognize the distinctive issues raised by interiority. The differentiation of consciousness so evident in Augustine is sadly lacking in his contemporary critics. Little wonder that so many have failed to understand the nature of his achievement. 
